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A NEW CORPORATE STATUTE: ADDING EXPLICIT 
PROCEDURES TO MARYLAND’S CORPORATE 
OPPORTUNITY WAIVER PROVISION 
Martha M. Effinger* 
I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment will reflect on the history of the duty of loyalty and
the corporate opportunity doctrine to further understand how and 
why corporate opportunity waivers were codified; it will also identify 
why states should look into codifying procedures to disclose conflict 
of interests within the waiver provisions.1  This Comment will 
analyze the corporate opportunity waiver provision under the 
Corporations & Associations title of the Maryland Annotated Code 
under the Corporations subtitle.2  
A director may have a business opportunity, which could be 
deemed a corporate opportunity.3  The corporate opportunity doctrine 
came from the common law duty of loyalty owed by the directors and 
officers to the corporation.4  It is most commonly defined as the 
taking of a business opportunity from a corporation by one of its 
directors.5   
After several years of litigation regarding what was considered a 
corporate opportunity, and corporations attempting to limit or 
eliminate the duty of loyalty through contracts, Delaware codified 
corporate opportunity waivers.6  Corporate opportunity waivers allow 
corporations to renounce, in advance, any corporate opportunities in 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.S., Business
Administration, 2014, Towson University.  Special thanks to Professor Fred Brown
for his valuable feedback and guidance on this Comment; to University of Baltimore
Law Review staff for their devotion and work; and especially, to my family and
friends for their continued and unwaivering support.
1. See infra Parts II–V.
2. See infra Section III.B.
3. See 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 862, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2018).
4. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
5. See Jeanne D. Wertz, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, LAW. BRIEF, Jan. 15,
2006, 2006 WL 224009, at *1.
6. Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty:
An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075,
1087, 1095 (2017); see also Wertz, supra note 5, at *2.
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their charter or by resolution.7  In 2014, Maryland enacted a very 
similar waiver provision.8  There is no language in the enacted waiver 
provision that provides procedures for corporations to adopt waivers, 
just language granting them that power.9  Conflicts of interest could 
occur when adopting a waiver, and with procedures in place directors 
can be held accountable and shareholders can be more protected.10  
Improperly taking a corporate opportunity could result in a loss for 
the corporation, which affects the shareholders’ interests in profits 
and the corporation’s wellbeing.11 
This Comment will argue that although all directors have a duty of 
loyalty, a more straightforward and direct requirement should be 
placed within the statute.12  There are many models that provide 
effective examples, which set out procedures for adopting corporate 
opportunity waivers.13  Corporate opportunity waiver provisions 
should explicitly state procedures that require full disclosure of any 
conflicts of interest, all material facts, and allow disinterested 
directors or shareholders to vote to adopt waivers.14  
Four parts will follow this introduction.  Part II will provide 
background on the duty of loyalty and the corporate opportunity 
doctrine, including the importance of the duty of loyalty and how the 
corporate opportunity doctrine arose.15  Part III will provide 
background on how and why corporate opportunity waivers were 
adopted and codified, first in Delaware, and then in many other 
states, including Maryland.16  Part IV will provide the pitfalls of 
Maryland’s statute and what models could be helpful to resolve the 
issue, such as including language that requires a board of directors to 
follow certain procedures.17  Part V will review the models and 
7. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1095.
8. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103 (West 2018).
9. See id.
10. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1116.
11. See id.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 9A-103 (West 2018); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2018)
[hereinafter ALI]; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-870 (West 2017).
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
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provide a recommended provision for Maryland’s corporate 
opportunity waiver.18  
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE DUTY OF
LOYALTY AND THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY
DOCTRINE
The root of the corporate opportunity waiver is the duty of loyalty 
and the corporate opportunity doctrine.19  Directors and officers have 
a fiduciary duty to the corporation.20  Directors generally have three 
fiduciary obligations towards the corporation—the duties of care, 
good faith, and loyalty.21  “The fiduciary duty of a corporation's 
director is not intermittent or occasional, but instead the constant 
compass by which all director actions for the corporation and 
interactions with its shareholders must be guided.”22 
The following subsections will provide the history of the duty of 
loyalty,23 the history of the corporate opportunity doctrine,24 the 
various tests the courts have created and implemented,25 and the test 
that Maryland utilizes.26 
A. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty in corporate law has been around since at least
the mid-nineteenth century, and has been described as “preeminent in 
the constellation of the fiduciary duties recognized by common 
law.”27  The duty of loyalty demands fiduciaries to advance, in good 
faith and within their authority, the corporation and its objectives.28  
A “duty of loyalty is generally owed by directors, officers, and 
18. See infra Part V.
19. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1086–87.
20. 6 M.L.E. Corporations § 159 (2018).
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing Storetrax.com, Inc. v. Gurland, 915 A.2d 991 (Md. 2007)).
23. See infra Section II.A.
24. See infra Section II.B.
25. See infra Section II.C.
26. See infra Section II.D.
27. See David Kershaw, The Path of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
395, 428–33 (2012) (discussing Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie Bros. (1854) and
subsequent cases and effects); Frances S. Fendler, Losing Faith: Limited Liability
Companies in Arkansas and the Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Good Faith, 31 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 245, 259 (2009).
28. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1086–87.
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employees to the corporation.”29  Additionally, the duty of loyalty is 
often associated with conflict of interests between directors and 
officers, and the corporation.30  It also requires that a fiduciary 
provide “an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation” so 
that there is “no conflict between duty and self-interest.”31   
B. Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
The corporate opportunity doctrine “is a common law doctrine that
limits a corporate fiduciary’s ability to pursue new business prospects 
individually without first offering them to the corporation.”32  It arose 
from the common law duty of loyalty in order to clarify a fiduciary’s 
duty and minimize court involvement, similar to the impact of the 
business judgment rule.33  It remains one of the most important and 
discussed areas of corporation law today.34   
If directors or officers violate the corporate opportunity doctrine, 
then essentially, they are not acting with a duty of loyalty, and 
therefore, violating their fiduciary duty.35  The purpose behind the 
corporate opportunity doctrine is to “remov[e] . . . any incentive [for] 
directors and officers to benefit personally at the expense of the 
corporation.”36   
Under the corporate opportunity doctrine, directors and officers are 
prohibited from “personally taking advantage” of opportunities that 
could be taken by their corporation.37  If directors or officers are 
found to have taken a corporate opportunity then “that . . . acquisition 
29. Eric G. Orlinsky, Corporate Opportunity Doctrine and Interested Director
Transactions: A Framework for Analysis in an Attempt to Restore Predictability, 24
DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 452–53 (1999).
30. Id.
31. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
32. Eric Talley & Mira Hashmall, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, USC GOULD 
SCH. L. (Feb. 2001), https://weblaw.usc.edu/why/academics/cle/icc/assets/docs/
articles/iccfinal.pdf.
33. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016); Business Judgment
Rule, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The rule shields directors and
officers from liability for unprofitable or harmful corporate transactions if the
transactions were made in good faith, with due care, and within the directors’ or
officers’ authority.”).
34. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1087.
35. 6 M.L.E. Corporations § 172 (2018).
36. JAMES J. HANKS, JR., MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW § 6.23 (Supp. 2017).
37. Wertz, supra note 5, at *1.
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violated [their] . . . fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and fair 
dealing toward the corporation.”38  
For instance, a director may discuss at a board of directors meeting 
an opportunity that the director has been offered and the corporation 
must decide if it will reject or take advantage of the opportunity.39  
“[I]f the corporation rejects the opportunity,” then typically the 
director is allowed to take the opportunity for the director’s own 
use.40  If the corporation accepts the opportunity, then the director 
must relinquish it to the corporation or simply not engage in the 
opportunity.41   
The corporate opportunity doctrine requires a director or officer to 
first offer the opportunity to the board of directors.42  If the director 
or officer does not disclose the opportunity and simply takes it for 
themselves, then the corporation may seek damages.43  Further, the 
corporate opportunity does not apply if the corporation, or an agent 
thereof, has knowledge and assents to the action of the supposed 
usurper.44  However, not all business opportunities are deemed 
corporate opportunities.  
C. Corporate Opportunity Tests
Determining what is deemed a corporate opportunity has been
highly litigated, and various tests have arisen in order for courts to 
rule determinatively.45  Courts have generally developed four main 
tests: (1) the line of business test, (2) the business interest or 
expectancy test, (3) the fairness test, and (4) the Miller two-step 
test.46  
First is the line of business test, which is sometimes referred to as 
the Guth v. Loft test.47  The Delaware court identified four elements 
38. FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3.
39. See HANKS, supra note 36.
40. Id. (“Only if the corporation rejects the opportunity may a director or officer exploit
it for his [or her] own benefit.”); see also Wertz, supra note 5, at *1.
41. See David J. Brown, Note, When Opportunity Knocks: An Analysis of the Brudney &
Clark and ALI Principles of Corporate Governance Proposals for Deciding
Corporate Opportunity Claims, 11 J. CORP. L. 255, 270 (1986).
42. Wertz, supra note 5, at *1.
43. Id.
44. FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 3.
45. Wertz, supra note 5, at *1; see also Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270, 278 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Indep. Distribs., Inc. v. Katz, 637 A.2d 886, 894 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1994).
46. See generally Wertz, supra note 5.
47. See id. at *1.
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when applying this test: (1) the corporation is “financially able to 
undertake” the opportunity; (2) the opportunity is “in the line of the 
corporation’s business;” (3) the corporation has an “interest or . . . 
expectancy” in the opportunity; and (4) by pursuing the opportunity 
the director or officer will be in a position that would impair their 
duties to the corporation.48  
Second is the business interest/expectancy test.  This test states that 
a business opportunity can be identified if the corporation has a 
foothold in an interest that already exists or an “expectancy growing 
out of an existing right.”49  This standard is narrower than the 
business line test.50  The highest court in Georgia uses the business 
interest test.51  The court held that although a business “had long-
standing [deals] with the customers in question” and the purchases 
were a “large percentage of the corporation’s business,” the 
customers were not restricted to that corporation.52  Therefore, there 
was no taking of a corporate opportunity.53   
Third is the fairness test.  This test relies solely on “what is fair and 
equitable under the circumstances.”54  In Durfee v. Durfee & 
Canning, Inc., a Massachusetts court declared that the standard of 
unfairness should be used.55  The court’s reasoning was that a 
director has a fiduciary duty towards the corporation and “taking 
advantage of an opportunity for his personal [benefit] when the 
interests of the corporation justly call[s] for protection.”56 
Finally, the Miller two-step test combines the line of business test 
and the fairness test.57  First, the courts ask if the business 
opportunity is a “corporate” opportunity by using a “flexible 
application” of the line of business test.58  Here, however, the fact-
finder answers this question, not only using the factors in Guth, but 
others as well.59  If the fact-finder deems the opportunity a non-
48. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939).
49. Wertz, supra note 5, at *3.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also United Seal & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Bunting, 285 S.E.2d 721, 722–23
(Ga. 1982).
54. Wertz, supra note 5.
55. See Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 80 N.E.2d 522, 529 (Mass. 1948).
56. Id. (quoting BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 204–05 (rev. ed. 1946)) (emphasis
added).
57. Wertz, supra note 5, at *3–4.
58. Id. at *4.
59. Id.  The other factors include:
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corporate opportunity, then the director is not held liable.60  If the 
opportunity is deemed a corporate opportunity, then, in step two, the 
fairness test is utilized.61  The facts and circumstances are reviewed 
and closely examined for “equitable considerations existing prior to, 
at the time of, and following the officer’s acquisition.”62  The court 
considered several factors in the second step of the test.63  Many of 
them consider the relationship of the director to the corporation64 and 
how, if at all, the director “exercised . . . diligence, devotion, care, 
and fairness towards the corporation,” which a reasonable person in a 
similar position and circumstance would act.65   
D. Maryland’s Corporate Opportunity Test
Maryland has “adopted the interest or [reasonable] expectancy
test.”66  In Shapiro v. Greenfield, the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals described the interest or reasonable expectancy test, and 
stated that a director or officer may not usurp the opportunity if “the 
corporation could realistically expect to seize and develop the 
opportunity.”67  In Maryland, “corporate personnel are ‘precluded 
from diverting unto themselves opportunities which in fairness ought 
to belong to the corporation.’”68  The Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals defines the corporate opportunity doctrine as “prohibit[ing] a 
fiduciary from usurping, for his [or her] personal benefit, a business 
the nature of the officer’s relationship to the management and 
control of the corporation; whether the opportunity was presented 
to him in his official or individual capacity; his prior disclosure of 
the opportunity to the board of directors or shareholders and their 
response; whether or not he used or exploited corporate facilities, 
assets, or personnel in acquiring the opportunity; whether his 
acquisition harmed or benefited the corporation; and all other 
facts and circumstances bearing on the officer’s good faith and 
whether he exercised the diligence, devotion, care, and fairness 
toward the corporation which ordinarily prudent men would 
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.  
Id. at *5. 
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Indep. Distrib., Inc. v. Katz, 637 A.2d 866, 894 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
67. Shapiro v. Greenfield, 764 A.2d 270, 278 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (quoting Katz,
637 A.2d at 894).
68. Id. at 277 (quoting Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 574 n.5 (Md. 1978)).
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opportunity rightfully belonging to the corporation.”69  It is clear that 
“over time [the court] developed its own labyrinth of rules, 
subcategories, standards, and tests,” and practically every jurisdiction 
follows a different test.70   
III.  ADOPTION OF CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY WAIVER
Consequently, as the various tests developed, the corporate
opportunity doctrine became unpredictable and over complicated.71  
In 2000, Delaware codified the first corporate opportunity waiver 
provision.72  The provision was added to Delaware’s corporate statute 
under the specific powers subtitle.73  This provision allows 
corporations to renounce, in advance, and in its charter or “by action 
of its board of directors” corporate opportunities.74  In the years 
following the enactment, eight other states joined Delaware and 
“grant[ed] their own incorporated entities the statutory authority to 
execute corporate opportunity waivers.”75   
Corporate opportunity waivers allow a board of directors to 
renounce opportunities.76  This means that directors and officers can 
move forward if they are interested in a business opportunity that has 
already been renounced without first offering it to the corporation.77  
Consequently, corporate opportunity waivers not only have the 
ability to simplify the corporate opportunity doctrine, but could 
encourage organizations to incorporate in states that have adopted a 
69. Lyon v. Campbell, 707 A.2d 850, 864 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (citing Pittman v.
Am. Metal Forming Corp., 649 A.2d 356, 359 (Md.1994)).
70. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1087–88; see also infra Section II.C.
71. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1087–88.
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (West 2018).
73. Id.
74. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1095; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 122(17) (West
2018).
75. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1078; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6102(q) 
(West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(17) (West 2018); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 351.385(16) (West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.070(8) (West 2017); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-1(q) (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1016(17) 
(West 2018); TEX. BUSINESS ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.101(21) (West 2017); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 23B.02.020(5)(k) (West 2018).
76. See tit. 8, § 122; § 17-6102(q); CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(17); § 351.385(16); §
78.070(8); § 14A:3-1(q); tit. 18, § 1016(17); BUS. ORGS. § 2.101(21); §
23B.02.020(5)(k).
77. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1077–78.
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waiver provision.78  The simplification, practicability, and balancing 
of interests that a waiver provision provides proves beneficial to 
corporations.79   
There are two main interests that are balanced in these provisions.80  
One is the shareholders’ general interest in the wellbeing of the 
corporation.81  Another is a director’s interest in certainty when they 
become a director, such as knowing what opportunities will be 
available to him or her.82   
Additionally, it is in the interest of the corporation to be a “healthy, 
growing and profitable business organization[].”83  A study on 
corporations that have adopted opportunity waivers found that the 
corporations “are on average, reasonably established firms with 
moderate-to-high asset values.”84  Furthermore, “[t]hey typically 
generate sizeable revenues, and they tend to deliver larger overall 
market returns to their capital investors by comparison to other public 
companies.”85   
Moreover, corporations benefit from corporate opportunity waivers 
beyond the simplification of the doctrine and balancing of interests.86  
Georgia’s commentary on their waiver statute provides practical 
business-related reasons for adopting corporate opportunity 
waivers.87  The comment, in pertinent part, states that the subsection 
“will allow corporations to attract, for example, directors who might 
be reluctant to jeopardize future business opportunities through 
service on the board without an advance agreement clarifying any 
obligation they might have to present opportunities to the corporation 
or to refrain from pursuing opportunities presented to them.”88  The 
commentary goes on to state that directors who wish to engage in 
78. See generally id. at 1129 (discussing Delaware's significant over representation of
companies that embrace corporate opportunity waivers and possible explanations for
such statistics).
79. Id. at 1079–80.
80. Id. at 1079.
81. Shareholder, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shareholder.asp
(last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
82. Corporate Governance, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corp
orategovernance.asp (last visited Jan. 13, 2019) (“Good corporate governance creates
a transparent set of rules and controls in which shareholders, directors and officers
have aligned incentives.”).
83. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1081.
84. Id. at 1080–81.
85. Id. at 1081.
86. See id. at 1117.
87. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-870 (West 2018).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
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“venture capital financing, financial advisory services or other 
businesses in which they receive . . . a variety of business 
opportunities from third parties with no relationship to the 
corporation” would more readily agree to a position.89  This is 
primarily because the directors have the ability to know beforehand 
what opportunities they may still take advantage of without fear of 
usurping one from the corporation.90   
There are many reasons a state may enact corporate opportunity 
waivers.91  The following sections will explain why Delaware created 
the corporate opportunity waiver and discuss Delaware and 
Maryland’s waiver provisions.92  
A. Delaware Codified the First Corporate Opportunity Waiver
Provision to Clarify Ambiguous Case Law
Delaware, as with most issues concerning corporation law,93 was 
the first state to adopt the corporate opportunity waiver statute in 
2000.94  Delaware “dramatically departed from tradition” when it 
adopted this statute, and since then, eight states have enacted similar 
statutes.95  The statute was enacted to clarify Sigman v. Tri-Star, in 
which companies attempted to limit or eliminate the duty of loyalty 
that a director owes to the corporation in the drafting of an article of a 
contract between the companies.96  The court’s ruling left room for 
questions and interpretation.97  The court held a particular article of 
the contract invalid, as it may “operate to eliminate or limit the 
directors’ liability for breach of their duty of loyalty to Tri-Star or its 
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
92. See infra Section III.A–B.
93. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1101.
94. Id. at 1077–78.
95. Id.; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6102(q); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-
103(17) (West 2018); MO. REV. STAT.  § 351.385(16) (West 2016); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 78.070(8) (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-1(q) (West 2018); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1016(17) (West 2018); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.101(21) 
(West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.02.050(5)(k) (West 2018).
96. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1090–91 (citing An Act to Amend Title 8 of
the Delaware Code Relating to the General Corporation Law, S. Res. 363, 140th
Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2000), http://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail/10399 (last visited
Jan. 13, 2019)); see also Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., No. 9477, 1989 WL
48746, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. May 5, 1989).
97. See Siegman, 1989 WL 48746, at *8.
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shareholders.”98  The court reasoned that if a possible scenario were 
found when a director could breach their duty without real 
consequences then the article would be invalid.99  The court 
postulated the following scenario:   
Under this intricately drafted provision, a case could 
possibly arise where a Tri-Star director who is also a 
director of Coca-Cola or Time (a) learns of a corporate 
opportunity that should otherwise be directed to Tri-Star, (b) 
causes that opportunity to be offered to himself, but not “in 
writing,” (c) alternatively, causes the opportunity to be 
offered to himself in writing but not “solely in his . . . 
capacity as a [Tri-Star] director,” and then (d) directs the 
opportunity to Coca-Cola or Time but not to Tri-Star. By 
negative implication, under Article Sixth that director would 
not be liable to Tri-Star or its shareholders “for breach 
of any fiduciary duty” arising out of that conduct.100
This excerpt outlines the concerns about the duty of loyalty in 
corporate opportunity waivers, such as protecting shareholders from 
directors taking advantage of their position.101  It also illustrates the 
situation the waiver provision aims to eliminate.102  Therefore, by 
codifying the advance waivers, the duty of loyalty cannot be limited 
or eliminated through a contract, like the companies attempted in 
Siegman, and the directors’ fiduciary duty is upheld.103   
Thus, the waiver provision is now statute-based, rather than solely 
based on common law, unlike the corporate opportunity doctrine.104  
The waiver provision gives corporations the power to adopt waivers 
for themselves, in some ways making the duty of loyalty a business 
judgment.105  The legislative summary to Delaware’s waiver 
provision states, in relevant part: 
98. Id.
99. Id.; Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1092; see also Del. S. Res. 363, supra note
96 (“The subsection is intended to eliminate uncertainty regarding the power of a
corporation to renounce corporate opportunities in advance raised in Siegman v.
Tri-Star Pictures, Inc.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
100. Siegman, 1989 WL 48746, at *8.
101. See id.
102. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
103. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2018); Del. S. Res. 363, supra note 96.
104. Del. S. Res. 363, supra note 96; MBCA § 8.70.
105. See Del. S. Res. 363, supra note 96.
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[The provision] permits the corporation to determine in 
advance whether a specified business opportunity or class or 
category of business opportunities is a corporate opportunity 
of the corporation rather than to address such opportunities 
as they arise. The subsection does not change the level of 
judicial scrutiny that will apply to the renunciation of an 
interest or expectancy of the corporation in a business 
opportunity, which will be determined based on the 
common law of fiduciary duty, including the duty of 
loyalty.106   
Delaware clarified the Seigman opinion and simplified the 
corporate opportunity doctrine without compromising the duty of 
loyalty.107  However, there is no language in the actual waiver 
provision regarding the duty of loyalty, disclosure, or any procedures 
for a corporation to adopt such waivers.108  Although it does state that 
judicial scrutiny will still apply, it would most likely be minimal 
compared to interference in the past.109  The Delaware provision 
states:  
Renounce, in its certificate of incorporation or by action of 
its board of directors, any interest or expectancy of the 
corporation in, or in being offered an opportunity to 
participate in, specified business opportunities or specified 
classes or categories of business opportunities that are 
presented to the corporation or 1 or more of its officers, 
directors or stockholders.110 
Essentially, a board is allowed to disclaim any interest in possible 
corporate opportunities in their articles of incorporation, sometimes 
referred to as a charter, or by resolution of the board.111  The board 
can name specific opportunities or categories.112  For example, the 
charter of an online retail start-up company may provide that a 
director may take opportunities in online markets.113  This would 
allow the company to obtain directors who may be interested in 
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (West 2018).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
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another company, develop an experienced board, and gain 
shareholders by showing an experienced board of directors is 
involved.114   
Additionally, the fact that the corporate opportunity waiver may be 
executed in a resolution, not just the charter, is an intriguing factor 
since they are easily passed procedurally.115  Other provisions in 
Delaware’s code that allow the waiver of fiduciary duties are 
required to be made in the charter.116  Here, Delaware does not even 
mention the directors continued fiduciary duty; it is only mentioned 
in the legislative summary.117  As previously mentioned, the 
legislative summary states that the amendment “does not change the 
level of judicial scrutiny” as it applies to the duty of loyalty.118  This 
means that corporate opportunity waivers should be looked at like 
most other decisions of the board, and that disinterested directors 
should make them after disclosure by the director or directors that 
have a conflicting interest.119  
Delaware was the first state to adopt corporate opportunity waivers 
but has not amended this provision further to explicitly include 
procedure regarding how corporations adopt waivers.120  Delaware is 
a leader in corporate law,121 and many states have followed by 
adopting corporate opportunity waivers, including Maryland, and 
used the same or similar wording in their waiver provision.122 
114. See Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1079–80.
115. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1097.  Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & 
ASS’NS § 2-408 (West 2018) (stating procedures for actions by directors), with MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-604 (West 2018) (stating procedures for amending
the charter with outstanding stock).
116. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1097.
117. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text; see also Del. S. Res. 363, supra
note 96.
118. See also Del. S. Res. 363, supra note 96.
119. Rauterberg & Talley, supra note 6, at 1097–98.
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (West 2018).
121. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1–2 (2007), https://
corpfiles.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf.
122. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6102(q) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS
§ 2-103(15) (West 2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.385(16) (West 2018); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 78.070(8) (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-1(q) (West 2018);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1016(17) (West 2018); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §
2.101(21) (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.02.020(5)(k) (West 2018).
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B. Fourteen Years Later, Maryland Adopted the Corporate
Opportunity Waiver Provision
In 2014, Maryland followed Delaware and several other states123 by 
adopting the corporate opportunity waiver.124  In relevant part, 
Maryland’s corporate opportunity waiver states: 
Unless otherwise provided by law or its charter, a Maryland 
corporation has the general powers, whether or not they are 
set forth in its charter, to . . . Renounce, in its charter or by 
resolution of its board of directors, any interest or 
expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an 
opportunity to participate in, business opportunities or 
classes or categories of business opportunities that are: (i) 
Presented to the corporation; or (ii) Developed by or 
presented to one or more of its directors or officers.125 
This is very similar to Delaware’s provision.126  For example, a 
waiver may not only be made in a charter, but also by a resolution of 
the board of directors.127  Further, no formal procedures are 
referenced for adopting a corporate opportunity waiver.128  Although 
corporate opportunity waiver provisions are an excellent step forward 
in corporation law, there are still some shortcomings.129   
There is some ambiguity in the waiver provision regarding the duty 
of loyalty and conflicts of interest.130  The duty of loyalty, although 
an underlying principle in directors’ actions, is not specifically 
mentioned in this provision.131  For instance, if a director requests an 
amendment to the charter or a resolution to renounce a particular 
corporate opportunity, but the director was already approached about 
possible involvement in the opportunity, then there is most likely a 
conflict of interest.132   
123. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
124. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(15) (West 2018).
125. Id.
126. Compare supra note 125 and accompanying text, with supra note 110 and
accompanying text.
127. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(15).
128. See id.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 130–32.
130. See CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(15).
131. Id.
132. See id.
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However, the waiver provision does not compel disclosure 
explicitly.133  If a conflict of interest exists, the director could still 
propose the resolution.134  Although the adoption of the waiver could 
be challenged later, the provision does not specifically require any 
disclosure or voting procedure.135   
In the alternative, if the waiver provision required procedures for 
adopting corporate opportunities waivers, such as full disclosure and 
approval by disinterested directors, then it would provide guidance 
and there would be a standard for the directors to follow that 
procedure.136  As many of the waiver provisions now stand, the 
conflict of interest duty of loyalty is implied, though not explicitly 
stated137 it arguably should be. 
IV. DUTY OF LOYALTY AND CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS IN
PROCEDURES FOR ADOPTING WAIVERS
Although directors have an underlying duty of loyalty,138 Maryland 
should adopt wording that explicitly states the procedure for adopting 
corporate opportunity waivers.  The new provision should require a 
director to disclose all material facts and state that the waiver needs 
to be approved by disinterested directors or shareholders.139  In order 
to have a successful provision, the new provision must balance both 
the shareholders’ and the directors’ interests.140  The following 
statutory models address these interests differently.141  In fact, 
Maryland’s Partnership title already has similar director disclosure 
wording that could be utilized.142  
In comparison, the American Law Institute (ALI) developed a 
corporate opportunity waiver, but still requires the director to offer 
the opportunity to the corporation.143  The Model Business 
Corporation Act (MBCA) created a business opportunities section, 
which refers to other sections regarding procedures and requirements 
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Indep. Distribs., Inc. v. Katz, 637 A.2d 886, 895 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); see also
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1 (West 2018).
139. See discussion infra Part V.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 80–82.
141. See infra Sections IV.A–D.
142. See infra Section IV.A.
143. See infra Section IV.B.
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for adopting corporate opportunity waivers.144  Finally, Georgia’s 
corporate opportunity waiver statute is based off of the MBCA, but it 
balances shareholder and director interests differently.145  Each of 
these provisions is discussed below. 
A. Maryland’s Revised Uniform Partnership Act
Maryland’s waiver provision fails to explicitly state procedures for
a corporation’s board of directors to adopt corporate opportunity 
waivers.146  However, Maryland’s Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
regarding non-waivable provisions explicitly states, in relevant part:  
(i) The partnership agreement may identify specific types
or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of 
loyalty; however, the partnership agreement may not be 
amended to expand or add any specific types or categories 
of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty without 
the consent of all partners after full disclosure of all material 
facts; or  
(ii) All of the partners or a number or percentage of not
less than a majority of disinterested partners specified in the 
partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full 
disclosure of all material facts, a specific act or transaction 
that otherwise would violate the duty of loyalty . . . .147    
Subsection (i) permits the partnership agreement to identify 
categories of opportunities “that do not violate the duty of loyalty.”148  
A partnership agreement is similar to a corporation’s charter and 
bylaws; all three documents lay out key information about the entity 
and the relations between its agents—partners or directors.149  This 
subsection also states that the partnership agreement may not be 
“amended to expand or add” any opportunity or category of 
opportunity without full disclosure and “consent of all partners.”150
On the other hand a corporation may amend its charter “from time to 
time in any respect[;]” depending on the corporation’s circumstances 
144. See infra Section IV.C.
145. See infra Section IV.D.
146. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(15) (West 2018).
147. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 9A-103(b)(3) (West 2018) (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. Compare id., with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-104 (West 2018), and MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-110 (West 2018).
150. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 9A-103(b)(3).
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the amendment would be fairly easy and may only require approval 
by a majority of the board.151  However, if there is outstanding stock, 
in order to amend the corporation’s charter a board must obtain board 
approval and approval from two-thirds of the shareholder votes.152  A 
waiver provision may not need unanimous approval because the 
provision appears to allow for a resolution or a charter, unlike a 
partnership, which requires unanimous consent.153   
Subsection (ii) allows disinterested partners to approve acts that 
would violate the duty of loyalty after full disclosure.154  This 
authorization may only be made by all, or at least a majority, of the 
disinterested partners listed in the agreement.155  However, there is no 
language that would allow this to occur in advance, except as 
provided in subsection (i)—i.e. in the partnership agreement.156  
This is an excellent example of a simple and effective wording that 
includes procedures and requires disclosure.157  Further, although this 
is wording of a previously enacted Maryland statute, it was not 
drafted or tailored to corporation law.158  Here, the statute only 
mentions the partnership agreement, as it is the controlling document, 
and is similar to a corporation’s charter.159  However, Maryland 
corporate law gives deference to the corporation’s bylaws and 
resolutions as well.160  Therefore, the new provision would also 
provide for those documents.161  
One of the weaknesses of Maryland’s current waiver provision is 
that it is only a subsection of the general powers subtitle.162  In that 
151. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-602 (West 2018).  See generally MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 2-601–12 (West 2018) (stating the restrictions and
circumstances for amending or restating the charter).
152. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-604.
153. Compare id. (requiring a two-thirds vote to pass a proposed charter amendment),
with MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-101 (West 2018) (requiring unanimous
voter consent for partnerships).
154. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 9A-103(b)(3)(ii).
155. Id.
156. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 9A-103(b)(3).
157. See id.
158. See generally id. § 9A-103 (discussing the details of a partnership and the laws and
rules that govern those entities).
159. Id.; What Is a Corporate Charter: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL,
https://www.upcounsel.com/what-is-a-corporate-charter (last visited Jan. 13, 2019).
160. See generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 2-110, -401, -404, -408 (West
2018) (providing “[u]nless the bylaws of the corporation provide otherwise” and
illustrating general powers of the bylaws).
161. See CORPS. & ASS’NS § 9A-103; UPCOUNSEL, supra note 159.
162. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(15) (West 2018).
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regard, this model is similar to the corporate opportunity waiver 
enacted now.163  However, this model provides procedures for 
adopting certain waivers.164 
B. American Law Institute
The ALI’s Principles of Corporate Governance addresses the
corporate opportunity doctrine165 and in an exception, grants the right 
to renounce corporate opportunities.166  The ALI’s § 5.05(3)(B), (C) 
allows for corporations to renounce in advance any corporate 
opportunities provided that they are rejected “following such 
disclosure, by disinterested directors” that “satisfies the standards of 
the business judgment rule” or disclosure by shareholders or 
superiors that does not amount to corporate waste.167  However, there 
is no mention of permitting a board to renounce the opportunity in 
advance in a charter or resolution.168  Moreover, this model does not 
fully allow advance waivers, as the officer must still offer the 
corporation the opportunity, but it does provide a standard for 
disclaiming an opportunity.169  Later in the section, corporate 
opportunity is defined, which provides even more clarity to 
corporations and their directors.170 
This is a good model to consult because it references procedures 
for disclaiming an opportunity, which are detailed in other areas of 
the ALI model.171  This model also defines a corporate opportunity, 
which would be helpful in deciding if an opportunity would fall 
under this provision or not.172  However, the ALI does not permit 
advance rejections of opportunities in the charter because it still 
requires directors and officers to offer the opportunity to the board.173  
This model provides a lot of protection for the shareholders’ 
163. See infra Part V.
164. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-504 (West 2018).
165. See ALI, supra note 13.
166. E.g., id.
167. Id. § 5.05(a)(3)(B)–(C).
168. Id.
169. See generally id. § 5.05 cmt. (a) (consistent with the approach taken generally in Part
V, which permits a director or senior executive to deal with the corporation so long
as the director or senior executive deals fairly with full disclosure, and places the
burden of proving fairness on the director or senior executive unless the corporation
was represented by disinterested decision makers).
170. Id. § 5.05(b).
171. See id. §§ 1.15–.16, 1.42, 4.01(c), 5.05(b).
172. Id. § 5.05(b).
173. Id. § 5.05(a).
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interests, but does not provide a director with certainty.174  Since the 
advance disclaimer is the primary purpose of corporate opportunity 
waivers, this model should be used as an example for format only, 
not substantive language.175 
C. Model Business Corporation Act
The MBCA § 8.70 sets out the provisions regarding business
opportunities.176  Subsection (a) broadly states that directors or 
officers are not liable for the taking of a business opportunity on 
grounds that they should have brought it to the corporation first if one 
of the exceptions are met;177 the exceptions are stated in subsection 
(a)(1) and (2).178 
The exception in subsection (a)(1) only applies to specific 
opportunities, not categories of opportunities.179  This exception is 
met if a director or officer brings the opportunity before they are 
“legally obligated respecting the opportunity” and disinterested 
directors or shareholders disclaim the opportunity.180  The subsection 
also references another section regarding the procedure for disclosure 
and approval, whereby after disclosure of all material facts, only 
disinterested directors, or disinterested shareholders as the case may 
be, vote on the disclaimer.181  An important distinction between §§ 
8.62–.63—the sections dealing with conflicts of interest with 
directors and shareholders—and this subsection, is that the disclosure 
must be before the director is legally obligated to the opportunity, not 
at any time, like the other sections provide.182  Second, unlike those 
sections where there is “required disclosure,” disclosure regarding 
business opportunities must “reveal all material facts concerning the 
business opportunity known to the director or officer.”183   
The second exception in subsection (a)(2) illustrates a more 
familiar version of the corporate opportunity waiver.184  Unlike 
subsection (a)(1), the exception in (a)(2) can apply to classes or 
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70(1)(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
177. Id. § 8.70(a).
178. Id. § 8.70(a)(1)–(2).
179. Id. § 8.70 cmt.
180. Id. § 8.70(a)(1).
181. Id. §§ 8.62–.63, 8.70(a)(1).
182. Id. § 8.70 cmt. 1.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 8.70(a)(2).
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categories of opportunities.185  Under this exception, the director is 
not required to go to the corporation first if “the duty to offer the 
corporation the business opportunity has been limited or eliminated 
pursuant to a provision of the articles of incorporation adopted . . . in 
accordance with section 2.02(b)(6).”186   
Subsection (a)(2) then references the section on the articles of 
incorporation, which is where the details of the corporate opportunity 
waiver are, including what can be disclaimed and how.187  
Requirements regarding disclosure and voting by disinterested 
directors set out in § 8.62, procedures for directors’ conflicts of 
interests, are embedded within § 2.02(b)(6).188  However, this only 
applies to officers and requires subsequent approval.189 
Under § 2.02(b)(6), officers can be included; however, “the 
limitation or elimination of corporate opportunity obligations of 
officers must be addressed by the board of directors in specific cases 
or by the directors’ authorizing provisions in employment agreements 
or other contractual arrangements with such officers.”190  This means 
that officers must present an opportunity to the board once it 
becomes ripe, unless it is in another contractual document.191   
Therefore, the MBCA does not allow officers to fully utilize the 
waiver provision because officers must still bring the opportunity to 
the board.192  This provision is attempting to balance the directors’ 
interest in certainty regarding opportunities allowed in advance, with 
the shareholders’ interests regarding the wellbeing of the 
corporation.193  Here, officers, including directors who are also 
officers, are lacking certainty because their opportunities are still 
subject to disinterested approval.194  Unlike Georgia’s statute, which 
is discussed below,195 this clearly dictates that officers must bring a 
ripe opportunity to the board of directors for approval even if it is 
within a category that is already disclaimed.196     
185. Id. § 8.70 cmt.
186. Id. § 8.70(a)(2)(6).
187. Id.; see also id. § 2.02(b)(6).
188. Id. § 2.02(b)(6).
189. Id.
190. Id. § 2.02(b)(6) cmt. 3(G) (emphasis added).
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. Id. § 2.02(b)(6).
195. See infra Section IV.D.
196. CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2.02(b)(6).
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This style of model is effective because it provides procedures for 
two instances—the creation of the waiver in the articles and when 
deciding if an officer is liable.197  However, the MBCA does not state 
whether a corporation may disclaim an opportunity after it has been 
taken.198  This is contrary to many of the states adopted waiver 
provisions;199 as discussed earlier, Maryland and Delaware allow 
waivers via resolution as well, which this model does not allow.200   
Additionally, the fact that officers must still obtain approval further 
protects the process of disclaiming a category of opportunities, as 
there are safeguards in place to prevent a board from improperly 
disclaiming corporate opportunities.201  This model does not give the 
same type of certainty to a director, only to an outside director.202  
Nevertheless, if standards and procedures are explicitly provided in a 
waiver provision, there should be no reason not to allow a disclaimer 
via resolution, or officers to utilize the provision without offering the 
opportunity first.203 
D. Georgia’s Statute
In 2016, Georgia enacted one of the most comprehensive and
modern waiver statutes.204  It is comprised of six subsections, and not 
only allows an action of the board to disclaim opportunities, but also 
shareholders.205  Subsection (a) states, in pertinent part: 
A corporation may disclaim, in its articles of incorporation 
or bylaws or by action of its shareholders or board of 
directors, any interest of the corporation in, or in being 
offered, or in excluding directors or officers from taking 
advantage of or participating in, specific business 
opportunities or classes or categories of business 
opportunities that are, have been, or may be in the future 
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-870 (West 2018).
200. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §
2-103(15) (West 2018).
201. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70(a)(1), § 8.70 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
202. Id. § 2.02(b)(6) cmt. (noting that an outside director is a director who is not an
officer).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 197–202.
204. § 14-2-870.
205. Id.
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presented to the corporation or to one or more of its 
directors or officers.206 
Georgia modeled this statute off the MBCA § 8.70 and various 
other state statutes addressing the corporate power “to disclaim any 
interest the corporation may have in certain business 
opportunities.”207  Georgia allows corporations to disclaim 
opportunities as they arise, in advance, and those already taken.208
This differs from Maryland and the MBCA because here, 
corporations are permitted to disclaim opportunity interests after a 
director or officer has become involved.209  The statute states that a 
corporation may waive an opportunity “after the fact, permitting the 
corporation to disclaim any arguable interest it may have had in a 
business opportunity in which a director or officer is 
participating.”210  Subsection (b) further supports subsection (a) and 
“forecloses a claim against the director or officer based on the 
matters disclaimed, whether based on the Code or common law.”211  
Subsection (c) states that subsection (a), as it applies to directors, 
“shall be effective for all purposes if the director brings such 
opportunity to the attention of the corporation (if such opportunity is 
not known to the corporation).”212  Subsection (d) has a similar 
provision regarding officers.213  Additionally, both subsections allow 
either directors or shareholders to approve the opportunity.214  These 
subsections appear to require directors and officers to obtain approval 
of an opportunity using these procedures; however, the commentary 
states that “[s]ubsection (c) describes a procedure available to a 
director who elects to subject a business opportunity, regardless of 
whether the opportunity would be classified as an opportunity in 
which the corporation has an interest to the disclosure and approval 
procedures.”215  The disclosure and approval procedures state that the 
206. Id. § 14-2-870(a) (emphasis added).
207. Id. § 14-2-870 cmt.
208. Id. § 14-2-870(a).
209. Id.
210. Id. § 14-2-870 cmt.
211. Id.
212. Id. § 14-2-870(c).
213. Compare id. § 14-2-870(d), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.2(b)(6) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016).
214. § 14-2-870(c)–(d).
215. Id. § 14-2-870 cmt. (emphasis added).
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approval should be made as if it was a conflicts of interest issue and 
that all known material facts must be disclosed.216   
Additionally, subsection (f) is fairly vague but states that it is not 
enough for a director or officer to not “employ the procedures” in 
subsections (c) and (d).217  This means that a director or officer 
cannot be held liable solely because they do not offer the opportunity 
to the corporation beforehand.218  In fact, the comment states that 
“failure to follow the procedures in subsection (c) would not taint a 
particular disclaimer or imply that the director should have presented 
an opportunity to the corporation.”219  A director or officer can bring 
an opportunity for approval as a safe harbor provision, but it is not a 
requirement.220   
Georgia’s statute is somewhat unclear regarding when the directors 
and officers should bring the opportunity to the board (or 
shareholders) and if it is required or just suggested.221  However, the 
comments clarify Georgia’s intent that these provisions are intended 
to “provide[] a safe harbor with respect to the approval process.”222  
However, the comments clarify Georgia’s intent.223 
216. Id. § 14-2-870(c).
(1) Such disclaimer is approved by qualified directors in
compliance with the procedures set forth in Code Section 14-2-862,
as if the decision being made concerned a director’s conflicting
interest transaction; or (2) Such disclaimer is approved by
shareholders’ action taken in compliance with the procedures set
forth in Code Section 14-2-863, as if the decision being made
concerned a director’s conflicting interest transaction; except that,
rather than making ‘required disclosure’ as defined in Code Section
14-2-860, in each case the director shall have made prior disclosure
to those approving such disclaimer on behalf of the corporation of
all material facts concerning the business opportunity that are then
known to the director, subject to subsection (e) of this Code
section, and that a “qualified director” is a director who, at the time
action is to be taken under paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of this
Code section, would be a qualified director under subsection (d) of
Code Section 14-2-862 if the business opportunity were a director's
conflicting interest transaction.
Id. § 14-2-870(c). 
217. Id. § 14-2-870 (f).
218. See id.
219. Id. § 14-2-870 cmt.
220. Id.
221. Id. § 14-2-870(c)–(d).
222. Id. § 14-2-870 cmt. (“The efficacy and consequences of disclaimers approved outside
the parameters of the safe harbor provision of subsection (c) would be governed by
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The Georgia statute is sufficiently comprehensive, and even though 
there is still some ambiguity regarding subsections (c) and (d), it is an 
excellent model.224  Georgia’s model, unlike the MBCA, appears to 
allow directors and officers to obtain approval for opportunities.225
Similarly, while the MBCA requires subsequent approval solely for 
officers, Georgia does not.226  This is beneficial because it allows 
directors and officers to know certain opportunities that are 
disclaimed pursuant to subsection (a), but also obtain approval for 
particular opportunities.227   
Georgia also balances the shareholders’ interests and allows them 
to approve the disclaimers as well, when necessary.228  And although 
it does not appear that subsequent approval is required, the wording 
and construction of subsections (c) and (d) certainly look like they 
are at first glance.229  A more effective provision may explicitly state 
that the subsequent approval is available, but does not affect the 
disclaimers efficacy.230  Georgia recognizes that this statute is 
necessary to provide structured guidelines and procedures for 
corporate opportunity waivers.231 
V. RECOMMENDATION
Although the codification of a provision allowing corporate
opportunity waivers is an excellent step forward, the duty of loyalty 
is too important not to be specifically mentioned.232  Maryland’s 
corporate opportunity waiver provision should require full disclosure 
and votes from disinterested directors or shareholders, as the case 
may be.233  In order to effectively provide these procedures, 
Maryland should enact a separate statute and use various elements 
from the models discussed above.234 
the rules otherwise applicable to corporate decisions, including, as noted above, any 
applicable duties of directors approving the disclaimer.”). 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 204–22.
224. § 14-2-870.
225. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 189.
226. See id. § 14-2-870(a), (c)–(d).
227. See id. § 14-2-870(a).
228. See id. § 14-2-870(c)–(d).
229. See id.
230. See generally id. § 14-2-870 (outlining the procedures by which specific business
opportunities can be disclaimed).
231. See supra notes 129–37 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 130–37 and accompanying text.
233. See supra Part IV.
234. See supra Section IV.A.
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Maryland’s Revised Uniform Partnership Act is a succinct and 
efficient model.235  However, it is geared towards a different form of 
entity and would need to be changed to incorporate corporation 
law.236  Additionally, consent from all directors is not a common 
requirement in board decisions.237   
The ALI model protects the shareholders’ interests since the 
opportunity must still be offered to the board, and does not allow 
potential opportunities to be waived in advance.238  Further, unlike 
Maryland and Delaware’s existing waiver provisions, the opportunity 
being waived should be ripe and presented before the board.239  For 
this reason, the model is effective in structure only, such as 
referencing other procedures detailed elsewhere.240   
The MBCA is effective because it has a section devoted to business 
opportunities.241  However, it provides detailed procedures for 
disclaiming a corporate opportunity in a different section, and in a 
completely different section from that, it grants the right to actually 
waive corporate opportunities in the charter.242  Although the 
structure and drafting essentially have the same effect as embedding 
the procedures in the same statute, it is somewhat convoluted and 
unnecessary to go to three different sections when attempting to 
properly disclaim an opportunity.243  It is more practical to grant the 
right to waive corporate opportunities in the section where the 
procedures for doing so are specified.244   
Substantively, the MBCA requires officers to offer the opportunity 
and obtain approval from disinterested directors for categories of 
opportunities that are already disclaimed.245  Thus, disclaimed 
categories of opportunities are ineffective for officers, and are not 
protected by the disclaimer, until they obtain subsequent approval.246 
235. See supra Section IV.A.
236. See supra Section IV.A.
237. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-408(a) (West 2018); see also supra notes
150–53 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Section IV.B.
239. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(15) (West 2018), and DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (West 2018), with ALI, supra note 13.
240. See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
241. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.70 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
242. See supra notes 181–89 and accompanying text.
243. See supra Section IV.C.
244. See supra notes 223–30 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
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Georgia’s statute strikes a balance between Maryland’s current 
waiver provision and the MBCA.247  Additionally, Georgia’s statute 
incorporates all of the elements into one statute.248  It would be 
prudent for Maryland to have a separate section for business 
opportunities instead of being listed under the general powers 
section.249  Although Georgia’s statute details procedures for 
disclaiming an opportunity in a separate section, there are some 
procedures within the statute providing that the disclaimer must be 
approved by “qualified directors” and that the decision must be made 
as if it were a conflict of interest issue.250  Furthermore, the Georgia 
statute provides certainty to the directors and officers while still 
protecting the corporation and its shareholders.251  
The structures of Maryland’s Revised Uniform Partnership Act, the 
ALI section, the MBCA section, and Georgia’s statute all have the 
wording for full disclosure of conflicts or refer to sections of 
procedure that must be met first.252  Therefore, Maryland should 
consult various elements from these models to create a statute that 
would work best and balance the shareholders’ and directors’ 
interests.253  The recommended statute should require full disclosure 
and only allow disinterested director or shareholder votes.254  
However, the recommended statute should not require officers (like 
in the MBCA) or directors to offer the opportunity to the corporation 
for the disclaimer to be effective.255   
It would be beneficial to separate the corporate opportunity waiver 
so that it is its own section and not a subsection of another section; 
this could be done by simply using the wording that is already in the 
provision.256  A possible drafting of the new statute would simply add 
language after subsection (ii) of the existing clause.257  The new 
statute would state the following:  
(a) A corporation may disclaim, in its charter or by
resolution of its board of directors, any interest or 
247. See supra notes 204–09 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 223–30 and accompanying text.
249. MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(15) (West 2018).
250. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-870(c) (West 2018).
251. See supra notes 223–30 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
253. See supra Sections IV.A–D.
254. See supra Sections IV.A–D.
255. See supra notes 192–93, 217–20, 225–26 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text.
257. See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(15) (West 2018).
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expectancy of the corporation in, or in being offered an 
opportunity to participate in, business opportunities or 
classes or categories of business opportunities that are 
presented to the corporation or developed by or presented to 
one or more of its directors or officers.  
(b) A director's or officer's taking advantage of, or
participating in, directly or indirectly, a specific business 
opportunity may not be the subject of equitable relief, or 
give rise to an award of damages or other sanctions against 
the director or officer, in a proceeding by a stockholder or 
by or in the right of the corporation on the ground that such 
opportunity should have been first offered to the corporation 
or that the corporation had an interest in, or in being 
offered, or in excluding the director or officer from taking 
advantage of or participating in, such opportunity, to the 
extent the corporation has disclaimed any such interest with 
respect to such business opportunity pursuant to subsection 
(a) of this section in a disclaimer that either meets the
procedures provided in subsection (c)(1) or is otherwise
determined to be effective as described in subsection (c)(2),
either with respect to the specific business opportunity or
with respect to a class or category of business opportunities
that includes such opportunity.
(c) (1) Action by the stockholders or board of directors of
the corporation approving a disclaimer pursuant to 
subsection (a) of this section that applies to a director or 
officer with respect to a specific past, present, or future 
business opportunity shall be effective for all purposes if the 
director or officer brings such opportunity to the attention of 
the corporation (if such opportunity is not known to the 
corporation) and such disclaimer is approved by the board 
of directors or committee, or stockholder entitled to vote, 
pursuant to the procedures provided in 2-419(b((1)(i) or 2-
419(b)(1)(ii) of this Title, respectively.   
(2) The efficacy and consequences of disclaimers
approved outside subsection (c)(1) would be governed by 
the rules otherwise applicable to corporate decisions, 
including any applicable duties of directors approving the 
disclaimer.  
(d) In any proceeding seeking equitable relief or other
remedies based upon an alleged improper taking advantage 
of or participation in a business opportunity by a director or 
officer, directly or indirectly, the fact that the director or 
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officer did not employ the procedures described in this 
section before taking advantage of the opportunity shall not:  
(1) Create an inference that the opportunity should have
been first presented to the corporation, that the corporation 
had an interest in, or in being offered, or in excluding the 
director or officer from taking advantage of or participating 
in, such opportunity or that the director or officer has or will 
have appropriated the opportunity in violation of his or her 
duties by taking advantage of or participating in the 
opportunity; or  
(2) Alter the burden of proof otherwise applicable to
establish that the director or officer breached a duty to the 
corporation in the circumstances.258  
This utilizes Maryland’s existing clause in the general powers 
provision,259 while explicitly providing certain procedures regarding 
corporate opportunity waivers.260  This recommended provision 
would be a separate statute under subtitle 1 of the Maryland 
Corporations & Associations Title.261  Additionally, this 
recommendation gives directors certainty regarding the opportunities 
they may take outside the corporation and gives shareholders security 
since the approval procedures must be followed any time a new 
waiver is adopted.262   
Furthermore, this recommended provision encompasses parts of 
Georgia’s statute regarding procedure and effectiveness.263  
Specifically, this provision allows directors and officers to obtain 
approval of a specific opportunity.264  Subsection (a) generally grants 
corporations the power to disclaim opportunities in the charter or by 
resolution.265  Subsection (b) states that an effective disclaimer under 
subsection (a) bars a claim against the director or officer who took 
the opportunity at issue, as long as the disclaimer was made pursuant 
to the procedures in subsection (c)(1) or (2).266  Further, subsection 
258. This recommended statute was taken, in large part, from Georgia’s statute.  GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-870 (West 2018).
259. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
260. See supra text accompanying note 258.
261. See CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-103(15); see also supra notes 246–49 and accompanying
text.
262. See supra text accompanying note 258.
263. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
264. See supra text accompanying note 258.
265. See supra text accompanying note 258.
266. See supra text accompanying note 258.
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(c)(1) effectuates a director or stockholder’s opportunity if the 
director or officer brings the opportunity to the corporation and it is 
approved pursuant to §§ 2-419(b)((1)(i) or 2-419(b)(1)(ii).267  
Subsection (c)(2) states that any disclaimers approved outside (c)(1) 
are subject to the rules of corporate decisions, like a director’s duty 
of loyalty owed to the corporation.268  Finally, subsection (d) states 
that any proceeding or suit brought against a director or officer 
regarding an alleged improper taking cannot imply that the 
procedures should have been offered or switch the burden of proof 
onto the director or officer.269 
This provision balances the shareholders’ interests in the wellbeing 
of the company by providing procedures for directors and officers to 
follow.270  Directors’ interests are also taken into consideration by 
not allowing a per se judgment or shifting the burden of proof on 
them just because the procedures were not employed.271  Directors 
are provided with certainty and a safe harbor provision, while 
shareholders have the protection of procedures explicitly stated in the 
statute.272 
VI.  CONCLUSION
Corporate opportunity waivers will simplify the overcomplicated,
unpredictable, and highly litigated issue of the corporate opportunity 
doctrine.273  Corporate opportunity waiver statutes should specifically 
provide procedures or requre full disclosure of all material facts for 
interested directors and approval by disinterested directors.274   
The duty of loyalty is one of the longest standing and most 
important pillars of corporation law.275  Therefore, it is vital for a 
statute limiting the duty of loyalty to explicitly state proper 
procedures and guidelines for corporations who take advantage of the 
corporate opportunity waivers.276  The procedures should provide for 
full disclosure of any material facts by interested directors and 
approval from disinterested directors.277  By separating the provision 
267. See supra Part V.
268. See supra Part V.
269. See supra Part V.
270. See supra Part V.
271. See supra Part V; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-870(f) (West 2018).
272. See supra Part V; see also § 14-2-870(f).
273. See supra Section II.C.
274. See supra Part IV.
275. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Section II.B.
277. See supra Part IV.
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into a separate statute, the requirements plainly uphold the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty, provide corporations with clear and conspicuous 
procedures, and balance shareholder and director interests.278 
278. See supra Part V.
